Egypt-Jordan relations refer to the bilateral relations between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Arab Republic of Egypt. Since independence, the two nations have maintained good relations. Both countries are members of the Arab League, GAFTA, the World Trade Organization, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Council of Arab Economic Unity, and the United Nations.
The relationship has been quite stable with some uncertainties occurring in the 1960s and 1970s. Afterwards, Egypt and Jordan both came under the control of Nabataeans, Arabia Petraea of the Roman Empire, then Palaestina Salutaris of the Byzantine Empire. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, both Egypt and Jordan became under British rule, with the Sultanate of Egypt and Emirate of Transjordan respectively. During this time, the Palestine Railways had a line connecting the Sinai Peninsula with the East Bank.
Diplomatic relations between the Egyptian and Jordanian government have existed since Jordan became independent in 1946. A year later, both countries jointly fought against Israel in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Despite some cooperation, Jordan and Egypt remain somewhat distant in their diplomatic positions, as Jordan's position was closer to the Western Bloc, while Egypt under Gamal Nasser had more Ba'athist policies.
On April 6, 1972, the Egyptian government severed relations in protest for a Jordanian plan for federation with the West Bank, which did not take PLO interests into consideration. These relations were restored on September 11, 1973. They were severed again in 1979, this time by the Jordanian government, in protest of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. In 1989, the Arab Cooperation Council was founded, bringing Egypt and Jordan together and improving their relations.
Egypt and Jordan do not share a land border and are separated by the Gulf of Aqaba and the Negev Desert. However, the closest distance between the two countries is only 11 kilometres (6.8 mi), which is between Jordan's Aqaba and Egypt's Taba.
Read also: Reviews of Egypt & Jordan Tours
In 1985, the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq came together and established the Arab Bridge Maritime to facilitate passenger and cargo shipping in the region. This includes a shipping route between the Port of Aqaba in Jordan and the Nuweiba Port in Egypt, which transports about 1 million passengers annually and is a major cargo shipping route for trade. In March 2025, Jordanian Minister of Labor and the Egyptian ambassador to Jordan met in Amman to discuss joint cooperation regarding labor affairs, in particular about Egyptians working in Jordan.
Egypt and Jordan are bound by a common Arab culture and have frequent cultural exchanges, where Egyptian cities host Jordanian cultural events and Jordanian cities host Egyptian cultural events. These exchanges include academic workshops and training programs and also include specialists in technical assistance from various fields. The two countries have a strong educational partnership, and universities from both countries offer scholarships to foreign exchange students. Egyptian universities offer 10 free scholarships for medical school and 15 for postgraduate studies, while Jordanian universities offer 100 grants to Egyptian students every year, including 20 from public universities.
Jordan’s Minister of Government Communications and official spokesperson Mohammad Momani reaffirmed the strength of Jordan-Egypt relations, calling the alliance a cornerstone of regional stability and cooperation. In an interview with the Middle East News Agency, Momani highlighted the “direct coordination at multiple levels” between Amman and Cairo, rooted in what he described as a shared commitment to addressing escalating regional challenges. He credited the close ties to the strong personal relationship and mutual trust between His Majesty King Abdullah and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi.
“Jordan has always viewed Egypt as a central pillar of regional security.” The minister also stressed that the two countries maintain near-identical positions, particularly on the Palestinian cause. “Our stances are closely aligned to the point of near identity.” “We will not allow the extremist Israeli right to undermine the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, nor permit attempts at forced displacement or starvation.
In recent years, there have been various mutual interests that have brought Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan closer. With their alliance, the three countries’ primary aim is to increase economic cooperation. The tripartite alliance also aims to collaborate on counterterrorism. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant still poses a threat to the three countries. In Iraq, ISIL has launched several attacks this year. ISIL has also conducted recent attacks in Sinai, which has been an epicenter of violence for Islamist militants in Egypt over the past decade. In Jordan, security forces thwarted an ISIL plot to attack a government building in Irbid in March 2021.
Read also: A Look at Jordan's FIBA Career
“Iraqi and Jordanian intelligence operators have often known each other all their careers, and it has helped that Iraq’s prime minister Mustapha Kadhimi was the intelligence chief and led intelligence diplomacy with both the Jordanians and the Egyptians. Iraqi and Jordanian forces train together regularly at the King Abdullah special forces academy in Jordan. And Iraqi forces regularly discover intelligence that is useful to the Jordanians and the Egyptians, especially regarding Sinai cells.”
Although ISIL has been defeated militarily, the group still has active sleeper cells. Some experts also argue that the alliance seeks to work as a front against Tehran’s and Ankara’s interference in the Arab world. During a visit to Washington in July 2021, King Abdullah urged Biden to back Kadhimi’s attempts to reduce Baghdad’s reliance on Tehran. The countries also aim to link their power grids so that Jordan and Egypt can begin to supply electricity to Iraq by the start of 2023, in efforts to reduce Iraq’s need for electricity from Iran.
The three countries’ concerns vary regarding the non-Arab regional powers’ approaches, and the alliance at this stage does not have sufficient influence to reduce Iran’s and Turkey’s leverage in the region. “The three-way economic coalition is too ambitious and remains in an embryonic state. The three countries explicitly seek good ties with the Gulf Corporation Council states. In fact, Sharif noted that the alliance invited the UAE to join, acknowledging the leading regional role Abu Dhabi is seeking.
For many years, Jordan has had close ties with the GCC states. Yet its ties with Saudi Arabia have seemingly cooled in recent years. Jordan did not cut off diplomatic ties with Doha after the Saudi- and Emirati-led boycott of Qatar in 2017, and Amman withdrew its support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, which frustrated the Saudis. While such events did not result in an overt rift between Amman and Riyadh, these tensions prompted a reduction in aid and delays in investments from Saudi Arabia, a stance that has left its mark on a Jordanian economy dependent on such external infusions.
Nevertheless, there have been recent signs of an improvement in Saudi-Jordanian relations, though the rapprochement is still likely to be a cautious one. But relations had at times been cool - something the Jordanian side definitely wanted to fix. For the Jordanian government, an improvement in ties with Saudi Arabia and potential strengthening of economic cooperation could ease concerns as Jordan deals with an increasingly fragile economy. While the country has started recovering from the effects of the coronavirus, around half of the country’s youth are unemployed. The public debt is another challenge, which has increased from $18.9 billion in 2011 to $40 billion.
Read also: Private Tours: Egypt, Jordan
In August, the government increased fuel prices for a fifth time this year, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund to adhere to an economic reform program, placing increasing stains on Jordanian citizens. Saudi leaders, meanwhile, may be changing their posture toward Jordan as a response to moves by the Biden administration. During the administration of former President Donald J. Trump, Amman felt its regional role was marginalized. The main area of disagreement between Amman and the Trump administration seemed to be regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
After the Palestinians, Jordan would have been the first victim of Trump’s peace plan for the decadeslong conflict. If implemented, the plan would have been disastrous for the two-state solution, leaving Jordan to deal with serious long-term challenges. The plan also did not mention Jordan’s role as the custodian of the Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, which is a source of the monarchy’s legitimacy. Meanwhile, Jordan seemed to be one of the few regional countries that celebrated Biden’s election victory. King Abdullah was the first Arab leader to meet Biden at the White House.
Saudi Arabia and Jordan also share concerns about Iran. The nature of relations of each country with Iran differs, as does its threat level. However, Jordan wants to keep Iranian-allied militias in Syria far from its borders. In July, King Abdullah told Al Rai newspaper, “Iranian interference is reaching several Arab states, and today we are facing regular attacks on our borders by militias linked to Iran.” He added, “We therefore hope to see a change in the behavior of Iran.
Iraq’s relationship with the GCC states soured after Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia was particularly slow to engage with the Iraqis. Washington encouraged the Saudis to reengage with Iraq as part of an attempt to contain Tehran’s leverage in the region. Riyadh, however, tended to see Iraq as loyal to Iran, primarily because of the Shia majority’s rise to power following the fall of Saddam. However, under King Salman bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia has been increasingly opening toward Iraq.
In 2017, then-Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir visited Iraq - the first visit of its kind by a Saudi foreign minister since 1990. In 2019, Saudi Arabia pledged a $1 billion aid package for the country, and in 2021 Saudi Arabia and Iraq agreed to create a $3 billion joint fund. In July, Saudi Arabia allocated a grant to renovate a hospital in Baghdad. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s invitation to Iraq to join the Jeddah summit acknowledged Iraq’s growing regional role. Since April 2021, for instance, the Iraqis have been hosting Saudi-Iranian talks in Baghdad. Since Kadhimi became prime minister, Saudi-Iraqi ties have notably improved, as the deepening of ties with Riyadh has been a key foreign policy objective for him.
Ties between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, meanwhile, have been relatively strong over the past decade. However, Riyadh and Cairo have diverged on some issues over recent years, particularly regarding Syria and Iran. The Saudis and Emiratis have steadfastly backed President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and have provided billions of dollars in aid to Egypt since he took power. Policy,” added, “The Jeddah summit also came after the Saudis pledged over $10 billion in aid and investments in Egypt since the spring of 2022 when Egypt faced new fiscal crises stemming in part from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which led to higher food and subsidy costs in Egypt.
The alliance has both economic and political goals. If it remains intact, it is likely to boost Iraq’s, Jordan’s, and Egypt’s regional roles over the long term. It will be interesting to see, however, the extent to which the alliance will be independent from the GCC. All three countries seek solid ties with GCC states, which suggests the coalition is willing to work next to the Gulf bloc rather than in competition with it. Likewise, it is not clear yet how this alignment could marshal much effort to push back against non-Arab regional powers.
First, Iran still has substantial influence over Iraq. Second, both Jordan and Egypt have peace treaties with Israel, another non-Arab regional power. This could partly explain why, although Amman and Cairo may not be enthusiastic supporters of the Abraham Accords, they are still likely to be cautious about their public reactions, particularly as they do not wish to negatively impact their ties with the United States, which brokered the peace deals. It is also important that within the alliance, the three countries’ concerns about Iran or Turkey are not identical. The Egyptians, for instance, seem to feel more threatened by Turkey than Iran.
In the foreseeable future, what seems most likely are incremental diplomatic improvements among the three countries, with continued efforts bilaterally and trilaterally to strengthen relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Notably, the three-way coalition - as Ryan puts it - “is not a new and powerful alliance in the traditional sense of a formal defense pact. The macro-financial assistance (MFA) for Egypt was approved by the International Trade Committee by 28 votes in favour, seven against and five abstentions.
Given Egypt’s critical economic and financial situation and its role as an important stabilising presence amid geopolitical tensions in an increasingly volatile region, the Commission proposed on 15 March 2024 to support the country with macro-financial assistance of up to €5 billion in loans. These break down into a short-term loan of up to €1 billion - already disbursed at the end of 2024 - and another, regular, operation of up to €4 billion to be disbursed in three instalments. For Jordan this is the fourth MFA operation since 2013. It should help cover the country’s residual financing needs, support its structural reforms and shore up its fiscal consolidation efforts.
Rapporteur Celine Imart (EPP, France), said: “The International Trade Committee’s backing for this EU loan reflects this Parliament’s high regard for Egypt as a partner country. By helping Egypt, we are also looking after EU interests in an unstable region. By endorsing this EU loan for Jordan, the Committee is helping to build our new partnership with the country, one that has recently been announced at the highest level. Both reports will be put to a vote in Parliament’s April 2025 plenary session.
US President Donald Trump’s comments on ethnically cleansing Palestinians from Gaza and forcing them into Egypt and Jordan could lead to a radical reshaping of regional alliances, analysts tell Al Jazeera. Trump repeated his intentions after meeting with King Abdullah II on Tuesday. He had previously indicated that he would use US aid to both countries as leverage to try to force them to go along with his idea. Jordan’s King Abdullah II seemed to attempt to placate Trump by flattering him and making a pledge to accept 2,000 sick children from Gaza into Jordan.
“I finally see somebody that can take us across the finish line to bring stability, peace and prosperity to all of us in the region,” the Hashemite monarch told Trump. Trump called the line “music to my ears”. Cairo and Amman have both fervently rejected Trump’s comments on numerous occasions and Egypt will host an emergency Arab Summit on February 27 to form an Arab-led plan to counter Trump’s broadly sketched plan. Both Egypt and Jordan have relied heavily on US foreign aid for decades.
Egypt has received more than $87bn in US foreign aid since 1946, though military and economic assistance increased significantly after Egypt signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1979. The current $1.4bn in annual military aid that the US gives Egypt started in 1979 after the Camp David Accords were signed between Egypt and Israel. Today, Egypt is one of the highest recipients of US foreign aid in the Middle East after Israel. US foreign aid also plays a significant role in Jordan.
Israel and Jordan signed the Wadi Araba Treaty in 1994, establishing diplomatic, tourism, and trade relations between the two countries that laid the groundwork for Jordan to receive billions of dollars in US aid as debt relief. The US now gives Jordan $1.72bn a year in bilateral foreign assistance. Jordan is reeling from cuts of $770m in economic aid from USAID, which helped fund some Jordanian ministries, like Education and Public Works, and supported the country’s water security.
This funding is a major part of making Egypt and Jordan’s economies function, but it also helps the US’s regional agenda. Jordan “has long served as a pro-West partner and continues to play a stabilising role, buffering Israel from Iran and its proxies, hosting refugees, combatting terrorism and extremism and serving as a strong and reliable ally to Western powers,” Dima Toukan, a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute, told Al Jazeera. Egypt offers the US facilitations in the region, “including the movement of US military assets across the region through preferential passage of the Suez Canal and overflights of Egypt’s territory”, according to an Egyptian government-sponsored article in Foreign Policy.
All US military aid finances Egypt’s purchase of weapons systems from US defence contractors, according to a congressional report, making military aid to Egypt an indirect form of subsidy for US defence contractors. “As a main lever of soft power, aid allows the US a significant margin to exercise influence, manage its image and cultivate common interest,” Toukan said. The prospect of Trump forcing through his plans to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from Gaza evokes stability concerns in Egypt, according to analysts. For Jordan, those fears are “existential” the analysts said.
US approves military aid to Egypt
| Country | US Foreign Aid (Annual) | Key Agreements |
|---|---|---|
| Egypt | $1.4 billion (Military) | Camp David Accords (1979) |
| Jordan | $1.72 billion (Bilateral) | Wadi Araba Treaty (1994) |
Popular articles:
tags: #Egypt
