South African Police Service Special Units

South Africa, a country known for its diverse cultures and complex history, faces unique challenges in maintaining law and order. To address these challenges, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has established specialized units, including the Special Task Force (STF) and the National Intervention Unit (NIU). These units are designed to handle high-risk situations that fall beyond the scope of traditional policing.

The Special Task Force (STF)

The Special Task Force (STF) is the elite special operations unit of the South African Police Service (SAPS). They are considered to be amongst the best such Units in the world. The Special Task Force has a daunting prestige in anti-terrorism/insurgency and hostage recovery.

The STF has consistently demonstrated excellence in high-risk land, sea, and air operations. From hostage rescues to combat missions, their actions are a testament to their rigorous training and dedication.

The Special Task Force; like their Military Special Forces counterparts, is internationally regarded as deadly exponents in the art of bush warfare.

The mission statement - which fundamentally embraces the constitutional framework - is in line with the purpose of the South African Police and embodies the philosophy and policing policy of the Minister for Safety and Security.

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History and Formation

In 1967, about 2,000 members of the South African Police were deployed to guard the northern border of Rhodesia (modern day Zimbabwe) to assist the Rhodesian security forces as guerrilla attacks became more frequent during the Rhodesian Bush War. These police members proved to be ill-equipped and ineffective at dealing with guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

As a result of these events the Security Branch of the Police began to envision a special police unit to deal with high-risk situations such as hostage situations. Captain J.J. de Swardt of the Security Branch of the Police as well as Sergeant Roelf de Plooy (a counter insurgency (COIN) instructor), both veterans of the deployments in Rhodesia against Zimbabwe African National Union rebels, began a grass roots attempt to form a group of police representatives with a shared vision of formalising a police-based special forces unit.

The members of this ragtag group were required to join the South African Police shooting club in order to acquire R1 battle rifles. Camouflage uniforms were also unofficially acquired. Because this group, who had taken on the name of 'Bliksems', was an unofficial group within the Police Force, the normal training facilities were not accessible.

A vacant area near the Baviaanspoort Correctional Services that could be used for live-fire handgun and rifle training, and which also had an urban environment with rural terrain, was eventually found by Col. van der Merwe. Capt. J.J. de Swardt then proceeded to hire instructors from Hunter Group of the South African Defence Force (SADF) such as martial arts specialist, Joe Grant Grierson.

Training was based around weapons handling, rural patrol formations and tactics, ambushes and skirmishes and was based on military protocol. Rock climbing, rope access, rescue work, skydiving and parachute training also occurred later on. Other instructors of the team were Bill du Toit (an ex-special forces soldier) who specialised in terror tactics, Mr K. Lucy who was an expert in rope work and abseiling, Mr T. Segala who had an extensive knowledge of booby traps and improvised explosives and Major J.

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In 1973, during the South African Games, the Israeli government stated that it would send their team but only on the sole condition that their security would be guaranteed. Gen. Mike Geldenhuys, who was the head of the South African Police Security Branch at the time, arranged for Capt. de Swardt and his 'Bliksems' to provide security for the foreign team.

For this, the South African Police received much praise and attention from the international press as well as a commendation from the South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs which solidified the idea of a police special forces unit. On 28 April 1975, however, a hostage siege occurred at the Israeli embassy and the Police (lacking an official counter terrorist force) could not resolve the situation. This became known as the Fox Street Siege.

In 1975, the counter insurgency conflict in South-West Africa (now named Namibia) also broke out and police and military manpower was now stretched between two COIN campaigns. In 1975, the Bureau of State Security supported the creation of the unit and on 6 June 1975, Brigadier Vic Verster wrote an official recommendation from the South African Police Security Branch to the Commissioner of the South African Police and proposed the structure, command and control plans for the Special Task Force.

Then finally on 1 February 1976 Lt. Gen. Mike Geldenhuys officially authorised the creation of the Special Task Force. Col. Dries Verwey was appointed as the first commanding officer (CO) of the Special Task Force and Capt. J.J. de Swardt and the core group of the 'Bliksems' were transferred to the Special Task Force as instructors.

After Gen. Mike Geldenhuys was appointed as the Commissioner of the South African Police in 1978, he transferred command and control of the Special Task Force from the Security Branch of the SAP over to Counter Insurgency (COIN) under the command of Major General Vic Verster.

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Major Operations

The Special Task Force has been involved in numerous high-profile operations, demonstrating its capabilities in various scenarios. Some notable operations include:

  • Silverton Siege: Three MK Cadres - Stephen Mafoko, Humphrey Makhubo and Wilfred Madela - were allegedly on their way to carry out a planned MK sabotage mission on petrol depots at Waltloo near Mamelodi. En route, 'the Trio' realised they were being tailed by the police. In an attempt to escape, they took refuge in a branch of Volkskas Bank in Silverton, Pretoria. After a series of negotiations, which included the police handing over food to the cadres and hostages, in the ensuing release operation, Special Task Force members killed all three cadres.
  • Laingsburg flood disaster: The Special Task Force lead the search and rescue operations. Forty-seven bodies were recovered in five days.
  • Hostage situation, Goedemoed Prison: Using sharpened objects, 22 prisoners attacked the prison warders at Goedemoed Prison in the southern Free State. One of the warders failed to escape and was taken hostage in a cell. The hostage was stabbed twice in the neck while one of the warders was trying to negotiate with the prisoners. The SAPS Special Task Force was called in to assist in the matter. Nine members of the Special Task Force were flown to Goedemoed Prison. The Special Task Force freed the hostage with the assistance of the negotiator (warder) and the Reaction Unit of Bloemfontein.
  • The Bus Capture at Lesotho: The Pope visited Maseru on the above date. Four members of the Lesotho Freedom Alliance hijacked a bus transporting 74 passengers at the British Embassy. The SAPS Special Task Force was called in to assist in the matter. When negotiations failed, the terrorists began shooting at the bystanders in the British Consulate. They then attempted to use the bus to ram through the embassy gates. The Special Task Force stormed the bus, killing three terrorists and capturing one. They disarmed an improvised booby trap (explosive device).
  • Body recovery at Selby Mine, Johannesburg: Two members of the Special Task Force assisted the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit in recovering a corpse from the Selby mineshaft, Johannesburg. The corpse was found at a depth of 141 meters. Obstructions, bad construction and the threat of toxic gases created additional hazards. Two members of the Special Task Force were individually lowered into the shaft, but were forced to return to the surface owing to respiratory difficulties. One member was given oxygen apparatus and lowered down the shaft again. After securing the corpse to a rope, he was hoisted to the surface.
  • Hostage situation in Walmer, Port Elizabeth: An ex-defence force member took a woman hostage and held her at gunpoint. As negotiations failed, the Special Task Force entered the building and incapacitated the captor with 2 shots.
  • Hijacked Fokker F-28 at Jan Smuts International Airport: A Fokker F-28 airliner of Royal Swazi Airlines with 21 passengers on board was hijacked and diverted to Jan Smuts Airport, near Johannesburg. The SAPS Special Task Force was summoned to the scene and 22 members were dispatched to the airport to contain the situation and release the hostages. After being informed by the psychologist on the scene that the hijacker was emotionally unstable and irrational and a threat to the hostages, the Special Task Force was given the command to recapture the aircraft and to release the hostages. The hijacker was wounded in the head during the storming of the aircraft. A hostage was wounded in the shoulder and the pilot in the leg.
  • Arrest of Weapon Smugglers at Nduma: Weapons were regularly smuggled from Mozambique to South Africa via the Kruger National Park which borders on Mozambique. The Organized Crime Unit and Firearm Tracing Unit requested the Special Task Force to be of assistance by way of observation duties of specified areas which had been identified by informers as areas which the smugglers readily use. Ten members of the Special Task Force were deployed to the Nduma area in the Kruger National Park where they established observation posts. The operation was successful and three Mozambicans were traced and arrested.
  • Hostage Situation and Attempted Suicide at Telkom Offices, Pretoria: A man armed with a firearm and was upset about the non-payment of his salary, entered the Telkom Distribution offices where he worked and took a number of people hostage. The hostage negotiators and 21 members of the Special Task Force were deployed to the scene. After prolonged negotiations, all the hostages were released but the man refused to surrender and threatened to take his own life. The Special Task Force were still in position and ready to take action while the negotiations with the man continued. While the negotiations were taking place, the man decided, without warning, to move to another office. The man was overwhelmed in the passage after his attention had been drawn by a stun grenade and he was disarmed.
  • Rescue Operation SALU Building, Pretoria: 28 members of the Special Task Force raced to the city center to assist with a rescue operation. A building with a number of floors was on fire and personnel working in the building above the floors which were on fire, were trapped. Members of the Special Task Force, SAPS Air Wing and SA Air Force using helicopters rescued people from the top of the building. Other members used roping equipment to evacuate the trapped people to safety.
  • Hostage Situation Bella Vista, Johannesburg: A man took his fiancee and her little daughter hostage after a family dispute. The hostage negotiators and six members of the Special Task Force were deployed to the scene. During negotiations, the man continually held a knife against the throat of his fiancee and also sodomised her in the presence of her daughter. The child was also ill-treated by the man while his fiancee had to watch. A tactical release of the hostages was the only way out. One member of the Special Task Force was employed as a sniper and during the tactical release of the hostages, the man was fatally wounded.
  • Kidnapping and Hostage Situation, Vereeniging: The Intelligence Service and CID of Secunda and Vereeniging requested the assistance of the Special Task Force in an operation to locate the whereabouts of a man who had been kidnapped and was being held hostage. Information at hand was that the man had been kidnapped by 3 men and was being held hostage in a Daleside, Vereeniging house. Nine members of the Special Task Force were made available for the operation and the kidnapped man was released uninjured during a tactical release. All three men were arrested without a single shot being fired.
  • Hostage Situation Hollywood Café, Sunnyside: A man fleeing from the SAPS on 6 August 1995, took a woman hostage in the Hollywood Café, Esselen Street, Sunnyside. The Special Task Force was summoned to the scene by Radio Control, after which the hostage taker was arrested and the hostage tactically released.
  • Hostage Situation, St Albans Prison - Port Elizabeth: Twenty-two members of the Special Task Force were summoned to St Albans Prison, Port Elizabeth where approximately 105 prisoners had taken a prison warder hostage. During the night of 24-25 February 1995, after prolonged negotiations the prison warder was released after a tactical release lasting 20 seconds. One hostage taker was fatally wounded. One injured and the other prisoners were arrested. The hostage was released without injuries.
  • Hostage Situation 34 Baccus Street, Irene: On 12 August 1996, a man took a year old baby hostage at 34 Baccus Street, Irene. The Special Task Force deployed 21 members to the scene. During negotiations, snipers were deployed in the vicinity. The snipers observed that the man held the baby in front of him with a knife to its throat all the time. The hostage taker only moved a curtain occasionally to see what was going on outside, but never let go of the baby. Negotiations which had lasted a long time did not succeed and it was decided on a tactical release of the baby by members of the Special Task Force. During the tactical release, both snipers fired simultaneously, fatally wounding the hostage taker.
  • Hostage Situation Nandos, Johannesburg: Three robbers trying to rob Nandos on the corner of Cromhout and Kimberley Streets, Johannesburg were cornered by members of the SAPS Johannesburg after being alerted by members of the public. The robbers took the employees of Nandos hostage. A gun-battle between the robbers and the SAPS took place during which two members of the SAPS were wounded. 19 members of the Special Task Force were deployed. During the release of the hostages, the three robbers were wounded and arrested.
  • The Jeppestown Massacre, Jeppestown, central Johannesburg: After a robbery, 23 robbers were followed by a police helicopter to a safe house. Four SAPS members were murdered and eight robbers were killed in the siege before the remaining 15 gang members surrendered.
  • Special Task Force snipers ended a 20-hour-long hostage situation at a farm outside Petrusburg in the Free State when two armed attackers took a farmer hostage when he and his son-in-law confronted them, after they had robbed another farmer. Thereafter the attackers hijacked the farmers' vehicle. His son-in-law managed to escape by diving out of the moving vehicle. Police chased after the vehicle at about 14:00, but the hijackers refused to hand themselves over and negotiations were carried out by the police hostage negotiator at about 16:00. The Special Task Force arrived on the scene between 17:00 and 18:00. At about 7:00 Special Task Force snipers shot and killed both attackers.
  • Marikana Miners Strike, Rustenburg: Members of the Special Task Force were deployed to the Lonmin owned mine in the Marikana area after two police officials, two security guards and four miners were murdered by striking miners between 12 and 14 August. On 16 August, after storming police forces with traditional weapons and small arms, 34 miners were shot dead by SAPS members and another 78 miners were injured.
  • Protea Coin cash compound, Robertsville, western Johannesburg: At around 17:00, the Special Task Force confronted a group of 20 heavily armed cash-in-transit robbers in a foiled robbery. After the robbers were cornered and opened fire on the members of the Task Force, they returned fire killing seven and wounding nine of the robbers.
  • Eight suspected ATM bombers were killed in a shoot-out when Special Task Force officers intercepted them as they were travelling to Howick.

Training and Selection

Candidates for the STF must:

  • be citizens of South Africa
  • apply on a voluntary basis and may choose to withdraw during any stage
  • have finished the six month basic police college training
  • have served for two years as an active duty police officer

The next phase, called prep-con, has an average drop-out rate of 50%. This is mostly due to inadequate physical fitness or the inability to swim. The next stage is the notorious Vasbyt phase.

Vasbyt is an Afrikaans word which was the language developed from the Dutch settlers who came to South Africa in the 17th century. Vasbyt literally means to bite down and hold on or to grit one’s teeth.

Jonah Lehrer, a former STF operator, described Vasbyt as, “[It is] … about setting a specific long-term goal and doing whatever it takes until the goal has been reached.

Vasbyt grads after a very grueling 6 month training phase.

All Task Force applicants are volunteers and have to comply with stringent physical requirements before being admitted to the basic training and selection course. The basic training course is twenty-six weeks long and includes weapons, rural and urban combat as well as basic parachute training courses.

Compulsory advanced courses include special skills such as diving, VIP protection, explosives and medical...

The National Intervention Unit (NIU)

The National Intervention Unit is one of the SAPS's elite units. It was established in 2000 to address high-risk operations and assist the Special Task Force as it was faced with an increased workload and limited resources.

Operational since2000
CountrySouth Africa
AgencySouth African Police Service
TypePolice tactical unit
Part ofDivision Operational Response Services

The National Intervention Unit will perform specialized tasks in urban and rural areas to combat violent public collective actions, e.g. The Divisional Commissioner of Operational Response Services will prioritise and approve the deployment of the unit to other provinces.

The National Intervention Unit can trace its origins to the Reaction Units which were established in the Riot Units in 1979. In 2000, the Division: Operational Response Services decided to standardize training and techniques for these units and formed the National High Risk Policing Capability.

Recruitment and Training

Prospective members have to be at least 21 years old and must have served at least two years in the South African Police Service. Prospective members applying to join NIU Units must follow the appropriate career paths starting at the Public Order Policing Unit, and then proceed to the Tactical Response Unit before they can join the National Intervention Unit.

All National Intervention applicants are volunteers and have to comply with stringent physical requirements before being admitted to the basic training and selection course. The basic training course includes weapons, rural and urban combat training courses.

Controversies

The National Intervention Unit, as a part of the operational response services division - along with Public Order Policing units, the Special Task force, the Tactical Response Teams and the air-wing - were a central part of the police strategy that resulted in the Marikana Massacre. Their operational commander at Marikana, Lieutenant Colonel Kaizer Modiba, testified before the Farlam Commission of inquiry into the massacre in which he was shown to have ordered his officers to immediately sweep the nearby hill for more weapons rather than seeing to the injuries of the miners who had just been shot.

This was "criticised because most NIU members had level-three first aid qualifications as part of their NIU training...

The South African Police Service special units, including the Special Task Force and the National Intervention Unit, play a crucial role in maintaining law and order in the face of complex and high-risk situations. Their rigorous training, specialized skills, and dedication to service make them valuable assets in protecting the citizens of South Africa.

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