The history of revolutionary left movements in Africa is often overlooked in academic literature, contrasting with the extensive research available on similar movements in other parts of the world. While revolutionary movements of the 1960s and 1970s in Europe, the United States, and Latin America have been extensively studied, those in Africa have received comparatively little attention.
Most of the existing literature consists of memoirs from former activists. In place of serious research on this issue, we find research and writing on related issues such as African revolutions and uprisings, invariably guerrilla warfare launched by liberation movements against colonial or neocolonial armies.
Still more research can be found on prominent figures, not to say tragic revolutionary heroes, such as Amílcar Cabral or Thomas Sankara who lost their lives in the struggle (and those like Patrice Lumumba who lost their lives at the start of independence).
Compared to the Cuban revolution in Latin America or to the Vietnamese popular war that inspired revolutionary movements during the 1960s and 1970s, the African continent might appear unfavourable terrain for revolutionary struggles. However, many revolutionary movements around the world during the 1960s and the 1970s, even if they have been able to challenge the state, were finally defeated - for example, the Naxalites in India and the Tupamaros in Uruguay, not to mention the Black Panthers in the USA.
Moreover, the extraordinary anti-colonial struggles and the creation of new independent states occurred during the Cold War. Anti-colonial movements and radical organisations within these movements were considered by mainstream observers as Soviet proxies rather than independent actors.
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However, such conceptions ignore the ability of African activists and intellectuals to embrace, create and adapt revolutionary doctrines for their own sake. In Africa, the ‘boom’ of Marxist revolutionary ideas occurred especially during the decades examined in this book. Later on, these ideas retreated from the continent, which can give the utterly false impression that it was mainly a Western fad.
In order to give an outline of the historical development of revolutionary movements in Africa, we propose a division into three periods.
- First, we identify pioneers who challenged triumphant colonialism in calling for Pan-Africanist solidarity (from London in 1900 to Manchester in 1944) and also for some of them in developing connections with Communist organisations during the interwar period, especially since the creation of the Soviet Union and the Third International.
- We then identify a second period which is shorter and more difficult to delineate, during the late colonial era and the aftermath of the struggle for independent states. During this time, anti-colonial movements became more radicalised, especially when confronted with delaying tactics from colonial powers. In parallel, during this period, the influence of communist and progressive forces grew to the point that the centre of gravity shifted from the diaspora to African territories, even when they were not yet mass parties.
- Finally, we see in the 1960s and the 1970s a third wave of activism sweeping across Africa, as it did throughout the whole world, and the Global South. These ‘anti-systemic’ movements were not only directed against Western imperialist domination, but also against ‘bureaucratised’ states claiming to stand for socialism.
Clandestine movements were burgeoning in every part of the continent, and a spirit of rebellion was challenging the political order. These countries became new bases or refuge sanctuaries for freedom fighters against the apartheid system, counter-insurgency campaigns and assassinations launched against the Black Power movement in the United States, Portuguese colonialism, and exiled nationalist activists and revolutionaries from struggles in Southern Africa.
However, beside these ‘spectacular’ headline developments, less noticeable radical experiences are to be found in every African country.
Cold War Dynamics and African Independence
The independence movements in Africa during the early 1960s provided foreign policy opportunities to both the United States and the Soviet Union. In his years in the Senate and months on the campaign trail, Kennedy promised to recognize and support African nationalism. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, also saw its history reflected in Africa. Nascent socialist revolutions were springing up across Africa in response to imperialism. Khrushchev pledged his support to national liberation movements around the world.
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Africa in 1960
Such sympathies, however, were tempered by the Cold War. The ideals of American and Soviet policy toward Africa fell victim to the realities of containment In Soviet foreign policy, anti-Americanism became more important than anti-capitalism. Reluctantly, Khrushchev had to embrace weak ideologies and endure shifting alliances among his African clients. The effects of the Cold War on Africa were stifling. In many respects, it was a second scramble for Africa.
Once elected, Kennedy’s diplomatic appointments reflected concern for Africa. Kennedy appointed Michigan Governor G. Mennan Williams to the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Williams, an idealistic liberal, was a strong supporter of civil rights and “proved to be the most effective and durable defender of a new approach to Africa”.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Soviet policy-makers also began to look more seriously at Africa. Khrushchev renewed the USSR’s interest in the Third World. In a January 1961 speech, Khrushchev pledged Moscow’s support to wars of national liberation. The CPSU position argued that national liberation did not end with political independence. Unless the new nation severs colonial ties and undergoes radical social and economic change, independence will be in name only.
Africa possessed several characteristics favorable to socialism-“the natural place of the commune in African peasant society, the near absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie, and the expanding role of the state sector”. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Soviets had four distinctive advantages in their relations with Africa:
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- Africans agreed with the Soviets about the connection between capitalism and imperialism. They believed that the two were linked, and both were worthy of elimination.
- Africans and Soviets had a common enemy. The former colonial powers were also anti-communist.
- No communist nation had ever been a colonial power in Africa.
- Africans admired the rapid development in the Soviet Union and saw it as a model for their own development.
Nevertheless, the Soviets felt frustrated in their attempts to realize this ideological opportunity.
Case Studies: Ghana, Guinea, and the Congo
Ghana
Gaining independence in 1957, Ghana was in the vanguard of the African nationalist movement Kwame Nkrumah emerged as the leader of the new nation. Although Nkrumah’s party held 71 out of 104 seats in parliament, his electoral mandate was not great. Nkrumah’s party won only 57 percent of the vote and was defeated In northern Ghana.
It would appear that Nkrumah’s triumph would be a blessing to the Soviet Union. Nkrumah espoused socialism and even thought of himself as an African Lenin. Nkrumah was a pan-Africanist the goals of an independent and united Africa took precedence over the socialist revolution. Furthermore, Nkrumah feared close relations with the Soviets would lead to a neo-colonialist relationship.
The Soviets had ideological concerns about Ghana as well. Although he saw himself as an African Lenin, Nkrumah was not a communist and did not adhere to Lenin’s concept of an elite-driven revolution. Nkrumah’s party “was, from the start basically mass organization”.
Ghana and the Soviets did not establish diplomatic relations until January 1958. It would be another year before the two nations opened embassies. Trade relations were also slow to develop. Events outside Ghana, however, would change Nkrumah’s ambivalence toward the Soviets into support.
Nkrumah was outraged by the December 1960 kidnapping of Congo Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. The Soviets quickly took advantage of Nkrumah’s anger. Within two weeks of Lumumba’s kidnapping, two of a promised six Ilyushin aircraft arrived in Ghana from the Soviet Union. Lumumba’s murder further hardened Nkrumah’s position.
Kwame Nkrumah
To rectify relations with Ghana and to prove his commitment to Africa, Kennedy invited Nkrumah to Washington. The March 1961 meeting was a success. assistance for the Volta dam. Nkrumah’s personality, however, predisposed him to personal diplomacy. Kennedy treated Nkrumah graciously, even introducing him to Mrs. Kennedy and daughter Caroline. The Soviets later used the same flattery during Nkrumah’s July 1961 trip to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev told Nkrumah that he was a candidate for the Lenin Peace Prize.
Vacillation between East and West was typical of Ghana’s foreign policy during the early 1960s. This caused Kennedy to continually reconsider the Volta dam project. Khrushchev was frustrated, too. The vagaries of Ghana’s foreign policy caused Khrushchev to hold back plans to sponsor the creation of a Ghanaian Communist party.
Guinea
Guinea would prove to be an easier test for Soviet policy. In a sense, Guinea “represented everything that Ghana was not”. Under the leadership of Sekou Toure, Guinea rejected the 1958 French referendum on constitutional union. De Gaulle had warned Toure that a “no” vote would be tantamount to a declaration of independence.
Sékou Touré
Economically, Soviet exports to Guinea rose from 9.3 percent of the total in 1959 to 44.2 percent a year later. Politically, Toure aligned Guinean foreign policy with the Soviets. Toure supported Khrushchev’s disarmament schemes and Soviet intervention in the Congo. He also provided refuge in the capital of Conakry for African revolutionary movements and gave the Soviets exclusive access to their leaders.
Although their policy goals appeared to be synonymous, the motives of Guinea and the Soviet Union were not identical. Whereas the Soviets wished to influence the East-West balance of power, Guinea held to an “uncompromising desire to keep its independence intact”. Furthermore, Toure began to complain about the quality of Soviet goods sent to Guinea.
In this climate, the election of Kennedy offered an alternative for Toure. In light of the isolation imposed by France, Guinea was dependent on Soviet aid. By May 1961, Washington had granted Toure a $25 million assistance package. Once again, the Soviet goal of promoting a revolutionary socialist state in Africa was confounded by realities.
The Congo
In January 1960, the Belgian government granted Congolese demands for independence. Six months later, the Congolese were free of Belgian rule. Unfortunately, the Congolese had not been prepared for independence.
The Congo faced enormous problems. “Fourteen million people drawn from over two hundred tribal groups had no sense of national identity”. Only a handful had earned college degrees, and only a few were trained professionals. To make matters worse, many Europeans In the Congo, fearing retaliation from formerly oppressed blacks, fled the country.
Such a power vacuum was tempting to both superpowers, especially since the Congo held strategic and economic significance. Located in the center of Africa, the Congo held a vital position bordering nine nations. Economically, the West obtained 49 percent of its cobalt and 69 percent of its industrial diamonds from the Congo.
Just five days after independence, a rebellion erupted. Congolese soldiers in Leopoldville revolted against their remaining Belgian superiors. With his speeches on the Africanization of the Congo, Prime Minister Lumumba indirectly supported the military revolt. Lumumba soon made his support explicit by dismissing all 1,135 Belgian officers.
On 10 Jury 1960, Belgium sent paratroopers to reinforce their troops stationed in the Congo. They were successful in suppressing the rebellious Congolese, particularly in Katanga province. Such intervention helped precipitate the secession of Katanga, provider of one-half the national revenue.
Nevertheless, ideological differences remained between the two. Kasavubu was pro-Western; Lumumba was a strong advocate of socialism. CIA director Allen Dulles believed Lumumba was another Fidel Castro. Eisenhower sent Lawrence Devlin to the American embassy in Leopoldville in order to set up a CIA office in the Congo.
In an August 1960 National Security Council meeting, Eisenhower declared “we were talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo, of Lumumba supported by the Soviets”. Eisenhower did not want to “lose” the Congo. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold refused to send UN troops into Katanga or agree to Lumumba’s request to put the UN forces under his command.
Patrice Lumumba
On July 20, Lumumba spelled out his plight “We will take aid from the devil or anyone else as long as they get the Belgian troops out. Lumumba was snubbed in his late July visit to Washington; Eisenhower did not even meet with him. Without an alternative, Lumumba accepted Khrushchev’s offer of military assistance. had driven Lumumba to the devil.
Lumumba’s acceptance of Soviet aid reopened the rift between Lumumba and Kasavubu. On 5 September 1960 Kasavubu fired Lumumba from his position as Prime Minister. Later that day, Lumumba fired Kasavubu. With the aid of CIA surveillance reports, Kasavubu forces captured Lumumba on 1 December 1960.
The incoming Kennedy administration, however, was contemplating aiding Lumumba. The outgoing Eisenhower administration was intensifying its anti-Lumumba CIA efforts. Kasavubu’s hand was forced. Now the Head of State, Kasavubu, the new Prime Minister, Cyrille Adoula, and the head of the military, Joseph Mobutu were all pro-Western. Kennedy was able to convince the UN to invade Katanga. Simultaneously, his policies restored order and kept the Soviets from proceeding with a unilateral military operation. policy coincided with Congolese interests.
The South African Communist Party (SACP)
The South African Communist Party (SACP) is a communist party in South Africa. It was founded on 12 February 1921 as the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), and tactically dissolved itself in 1950 in the face of being declared illegal by the governing National Party under the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950. The Communist Party was reconstituted underground and re-launched as the SACP in 1953, participating in the struggle to end the apartheid system.
It is a member of the ruling Tripartite Alliance alongside the African National Congress and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and through this it influences the South African government. The party's Central Committee is the party's highest decision-making structure.
Flag of the SACP
The Communist Party of South Africa was founded in 1921 by the joining together of the International Socialist League and others under the leadership of William H. Andrews. It first came to prominence during the Rand Rebellion, a strike by white miners in 1922. The large mining concerns, facing labour shortages and wage pressures, had announced their intention of engaging blacks in semi-skilled and some higher-level jobs at low wage rates, compared to their white counterparts who enjoyed the monopoly of higher and well-paying occupations.
The party thus reoriented itself at its 1924 Party Congress towards organising black workers and "Africanising" the party. By 1928, 1,600 of the party's 1,750 members were black. In the same year, the Communist International adopted a resolution for the CPSA to adopt the "Native Republic" thesis, which stipulated that South Africa is a country belonging to the natives, that is, the Indigenous Black population, and that most of South Africa's revolutionary potential laid with them.
In 1946, the CPSA along with the African National Congress participated in the general strike that was started by the African Mine Workers' Strike in 1946. After its voluntary dissolution, the CPSA was declared illegal in 1950. In 1953, a group of former CPSA members launched the South African Communist Party that remained - as had been the CPSA - aligned with the Soviet Union.
Following the dissolution and subsequent banning of the CPSA, former party members and, after 1953, members of the SACP adopted a policy of primarily working within the ANC in order to reorient that organisation's programme from a nationalist policy akin to the CPSA's former Native Republic policy towards a non-racial programme which declared that all ethnic groups residing in South Africa had equal rights to the country.
The Congress Alliance committed itself to a democratic, non-racial South Africa where the "people shall govern" through the Freedom Charter. The SACP played a role in the development of the Freedom Charter through its cadres who were openly active in the Congress Alliance and in the Party's underground organisation.
In exile, communist nations provided the ANC with funding and firearms. With victory a number of communists occupied prominent positions on the ANC benches in parliament. Most prominently, Nelson Mandela appointed Joe Slovo as Minister for Housing.
In December 2017, the party contested a number of local council by-elections in Metsimaholo Local Municipality in the Free State, failing to win any first-past-the-post ward seats, but gaining three proportional representation seats.
Next to the 109-year old governing African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party is the second oldest political organisation in Africa. But, South African communists did more than outlive their rivals and opponents.
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