The History of Armored Cars in South Africa

Nov 06, 2025 0

South Africa has a rich history of armored vehicle development, driven by necessity and innovation. This article explores the evolution of South African armored cars, from their early beginnings to their deployment in various conflicts.

Marmon-Herrington Mk IV Armoured Car

Early Development: The Marmon-Herrington Series

The Marmon-Herrington armoured car was a series of armoured vehicles that were produced in South Africa and adopted by the British Army during World War II. In 1938 the South African authorities began funding development of a new armoured car for the Union Defence Force. The outbreak of World War II led to a vehicle based on a Ford 3-ton truck chassis.

As South Africa then lacked a developed automotive industry, many components of the vehicle had to be imported. Chassis components were purchased from Ford Canada and fitted with a four-wheel drive train produced by the American company Marmon-Herrington (hence the designation). The first version, the "South African Reconnaissance Vehicle" Mk I, entered service in 1940. It was a long wheelbase four-wheeled chassis with drive to only one axle. It was armed with two Vickers machine guns: one in a cylindrical turret and the other in the left side of the hull. There were two large access doors in the rear.

The Mk II had a shorter wheelbase than the Mark I, and had four wheel drive by using a kit from Marmon-Herrington that offered a front-driven axle. It was known in British service as armoured car, Marmon-Herrington Mk II. The Mark I continued in production (until the end of 1940) while supply of parts from the United States was resolved. Mark II "Middle East Model" denoted the vehicles serving with British forces in the North African campaign. This variant was fitted with a Boys anti-tank rifle and a single coaxial Bren light machine gun.

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Marmon Herrington Mk II in the Western Desert

Marmon-Herringtons saw extensive combat in North Africa, being the only armoured car available to Commonwealth divisions in sufficient numbers, and had a reputation as a dependable, if somewhat light and undergunned, vehicle. As an unusual quantity of German, Vichy French, and Italian weaponry was captured during desert engagements, often Allied troops modified their Mk IIs by mounting Breda Model 35, Breda Meccanica Bresciana, 3.7 cm Pak 36 and 2.8 cm sPzB 41 anti-tank guns. As the turret made no provision for larger armament, it was simply removed and crew members depended on gun shields for protection.

The Mark III was created with thicker armour plate on a compact body, which included a shorter wheelbase. More than 2,000 Mark IIIs were exported before production ceased in mid-1942. Some were dispatched to the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army and arrived during the East Indies Campaign. Local crews adopted the earlier South African configuration of twin Vickers machine guns; in Dutch service these were designated Zuid-Afrikaanse pantserautos and continued to serve as late as the Indonesian National Revolution.

In March 1943 a completely redesigned Mk IV/Mk IVF entered production. It was a monocoque with rear-mounted engine and a turret-mounted 2-pounder with a coaxial .30 in (7.62 mm) Browning machine gun as the standard armament. Due to the inability of Marmon-Herrington to supply sufficient drivetrains, the Mk IVF used a Ford Canada drive train. Further versions were designed but never got beyond the prototype stage.

In total, 5,746 Marmon-Herrington armoured cars were built. About 4,500 were used by South African units, while others were employed by British, Indian, New Zealand, Greek, Free French, Polish, Dutch East Indies, and Belgian forces. After World War II, a few were given to the Trans-Jordan and saw combat with the Arab Legion in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The Mk IVF saw combat as late as July-August 1974, during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, when it was used by the Cypriot National Guard. The Greek army used Marmon-Herringtons in the islands of the Aegean well into the 1990s, in mechanized infantry battalions of special composition, alongside Jeeps, M-113s, and Leonidas AFVs.

Marmon-Herrington Variants

Mk I (1940) - two wheel drive only, armed with two .303 in (7.7 mm) Vickers machine guns, one in a cylindrical turret, other in the left rear of the hull.
Mk II (1941) - lengthened chassis, all-wheel drive. Early vehicles carried the same armament as Mk I. Late production vehicles received an octagonal turret with Boys anti-tank rifle and Bren MG. There were pintle mountings for Vickers MG and Bren MG (the latter was rarely carried). Hull was riveted in early vehicles and welded in late production ones.
Mk III (1941) - similar to late production Mk II, with a slightly shorter wheelbase. Late production vehicles had single rear door, no radiator grille and no headlight covers.
Mk IIIA - turret replaced by a ring mount for two .303 in (7.7 mm) Vickers K machine guns protected by a steel skirt.
Mk IV (1943): The Mark IV was a completely redesigned vehicle, though still based on the same engine and Marmon-Herrington components. The rear-mounted engine and the transmission were bolted directly to the welded hull. Armour protection was still thin at only 12 mm to the front and 6 mm thick elsewhere. A QF 2 pounder anti-tank gun was mounted in a two-man turret. The gun used an artillery mounting as the turret was not up to the stress of a tank mantlet mounting. Late production vehicles had a coaxial Browning MG. An anti-aircraft Vickers or Browning MG was mounted on the turret roof. Over 2,000 units built.

The Mark V was one of four 8-wheeled designs built as a response to reports of the German 8-wheeled armoured cars (Schwerer Panzerspähwagen). Power was from two Albion 6-cylinder engines driving only the two middle axles. The prototype had poor performance in desert conditions and was rebuilt with both engines at the rear. Although well-armoured, it was heavy at 16 tons and performance still lacked, so the project was stopped.

The Mark VI was a return to the 8-wheeled design. Powered by two Mercury V8 engines with an eight-wheel drive steered on the front and rear wheels. Two prototypes were built, one with a 2-pounder and other with a 6-pounder gun in an open-topped three-man turret with electric-powered traverse, protected by 10 to 30 mm of sloped armour. Additional armament consisted of two or three machine guns.

There was also a version similar to the Mk III but with a 2-pounder gun in a bigger turret.

South African Armoured Car Marmon Herrington Mk III

Post-War Developments and the Eland

For many years the standard armoured car of the South African Defence Force was the Daimler Ferret, which was developed in the late 1940s and armed with a single general-purpose machine gun. By the mid-1960s, Ferret spares were becoming difficult to obtain, and its armament was considered less than adequate.

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During all the operations led against the SWAPO rebels (South-West Africa People’s Organization), the armored cars inspired a local production version, the Eland Mk.7, and quick-started the production of other vehicles. The Centurion became the only tank in service with the SADF,whereas wheeled armored vehicles were developed and became an integral part of the SADF specificity.

South African Eland Light Armoured Car (licence built Panhard AML)

The Eland-90s brought to bear enormous firepower, they possessed limited ammunition stowage capacity. During Operation Savannah, it was not uncommon for an Eland to expend all its stored ammunition during a firefight and have to withdraw to the rear to resupply. Fourthly, the Eland was not designed as a troop-carrying vehicle.

During the course of Operation Reindeer, numerous Elands repeatedly stalled in mud and even loose sand, leaving no alternative but to tow them out with the much heavier Ratels. The speed at which the combat team was able to cover ground was negatively affected by the Elands' poor momentum on broken terrain. Their petrol engines were also an issue, since this factor necessitated a separate logistics apparatus from those of the Ratels.

Eland 90 armored car of the South African Army

Although they remained relatively popular with the armoured corps, Elands were not well-regarded by the mechanised infantry due to several unsuccessful attempts to integrate them with Ratel-mounted combat teams.

A year later, PLAN began adopting mine warfare as an integral part of its attempts to hinder the mobility of South African convoys on the limited road network. Mine-laying was often used as a means to throw the convoys into disarray prior to an ambush. This tactic resulted in some of the heaviest SADF and police casualties thus far and evolved into one of the most defining features of PLAN's war effort for the next two decades. The SADF's immediate solution was to utilise its Elands for convoy escort purposes, as they were the only vehicles it possessed capable of surviving a mine explosion and also suppressing an ambush. An Eland-60 or Eland-90 was delegated to lead each convoy, with the other drivers continuing in its tracks. However, it soon became clear this practice was not an effective countermeasure.

The Angolan War and Lessons Learned

During the Cold War, Africa became a prime location for proxy wars between the East and the West. Over the following years, the country became involved in the war in Angola, which gradually grew in ferocity and converted into a conventional war. The results were designs for some of the most robust armored vehicles produced anywhere in the world for their time, and highly influential for further development in multiple fields ever since.

During the border wars, SANDF forces captured a large array of Soviet-built Angolan/Cuban vehicles: T-34/85s, T-54s, T-72Ms, BMP-1s, MT-LBs with SA-13 “GOPHER” SAMs, BTR-152s and BTR-60s. Contrary to Israel, these were displayed as “spoils of war”, but never reused in active service. Angola in particular was an ideal battleground to compare Soviet equipment with the western one used by SANDF forces.

The action at Norton de Metos had deeply shaken South Africa's confidence in UNITA's ability to win the war against FAPLA on its own, especially with its limited arsenal. During a meeting with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and the heads of the advisory mission on October 7, the SADF instructors argued that they would need better armour assets than the handful of dilapidated AMLs possessed by Savimbi. Their request was approved on the condition that any extension of the SADF's operational capacities in Angola remain strictly covert.

All equipment, weapons, vehicles, and ammunition bound for the Angolan front were to be supplied through nonconventional channels and unmarked. SADF uniforms and insignia were explicitly prohibited. On October 9, a squadron of Eland-90s and their crews were hurriedly deployed to the border, ready to be airlifted deep into Angola five days later. The personnel involved were stripped of all their identifiable equipment, even their dog tags, and re-issued with nondescript uniforms and personal weapons impossible to trace. They were told to pose as mercenaries if questioned.

South Africa's decision to terminate Operation Savannah in the face of heavy international opposition and an increasingly formidable Cuban troop presence was made around January 1976, and the last SADF forces departed Angola in March. A detailed study of the Eland's advantages and shortcomings during that campaign was subsequently undertaken by the South African Armoured Corps.

Much of the lessons learned from Angolan operations could also be readily applied to northern South West Africa, where the characteristics of the annual rainy season, compounded by dense vegetation and muddy terrain, were quite similar. Eland crews found that the density of the bush impeded their mobility, line of vision, and the traversing angle of their turrets. The region was also prone to dry flood plains, which filled into marshlike oshanas during the rainy season and posed a notoriously difficult obstacle for the four-wheeled armoured cars.

Operation Protea and Later Engagements

SWAPO cadres and their Angolan hosts were undeterred by preceding SADF campaigns. Partisan recruitment continued in earnest, and the difficulties experienced in storming "Smokeshell" forced South African tacticians to recognise that conventional cross-border operations were intricate affairs.

Nevertheless, Operation Sceptic had demonstrated that pressure on the home front could be relieved with aggressive preemptive or counterstrike strategy. In August 1981, four mechanised battlegroups staged Operation Protea - converging on SWAPO camps at Ongiva and Xangongo. At least three were equipped with Eland-90s, the remainder of the force being bolstered by Ratels and Eland-60s (again seconded to an artillery troop). Protea had three objectives: to disrupt SWAPO's logistical apparatus in southern Angola, to preempt further infiltration of South West Africa, and to capture or destroy as much military equipment as possible.

This offensive was destined to encounter an unexpectedly large presence of Angolan regular forces, who brought their heavy armour into offensive action for the first time. In preparation for potential encounters with FAPLA T-34-85 tanks, elements of 61 Mechanised practised "firebelt" actions, integrating mutual support and specialised manoeuvres.

Angolan troops counterattacked on at least two occasions with T-34s, three of which were annihilated by concentrated fire from the Ratel or Eland-90 squadrons.

Modernization and Reorganization

In 1990-91, the Army was reconstituted with three divisions, the 7th (Johannesburg), 8th (Durban) and 9th (Cape Town), later renamed 73rd, 74th and 75th Brigades when amalgamated into the 7th South African Division on 1 April 1997. The latter was disbanded on 1 April 1999 and the units were reorganized into “type” formation force structure. These followed the Deloitte and Touche recommendations, allowing the army to be more cost-efficient.

At the same time, various changes hit the military hierarchy inherited from the Apartheid, powered by a certain mistrust by the new Mandela government. These well-awaited reforms also ended segregation and implemented racial quotas.

While the Army is modernized and reorganized, it faces the new threat of international Islamic terrorism in nearby countries. In 2006 the ARMY VISION 2020 guidelines document was published, returning to a planned division based structure with two divisions and a special operations brigade plus a work regiment. These steered away from the Deloitte and Touche inspired organization.

One of the latest intervention was in 2013 with the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade deployed in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, with a UN mandate.