The historical relations between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can be traced back several centuries. The relations between earlier regimes in Egypt, such as the highly autonomous Egypt Eyalet in the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Egypt, and the earlier manifestations of Saudi/Wahhabi power in the Arabian Peninsula (Emirate of Diriyah) laid the foundation for the modern relationship.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt are both highly influential countries in the Arab world. Egypt is the most populous Arab country, and Saudi Arabia is a member of the G20.
King Abdulaziz Al Saud declared long ago, “The Arabs cannot do without Egypt, and Egypt cannot do without the Arabs.” This profound statement underscores the unique nature of Egyptian-Saudi relations, with Egypt serving as a strategic depth for Saudi Arabia and vice versa.
Led by President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, King Salman bin Abdulaziz, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Egyptian-Saudi relations have flourished. The frequency of visits between leaders of the two nations has increased, and cooperation has expanded to include military, economic, and investment sectors.
This steadfast partnership is an indisputable fact, evidenced by the enduring bond that dates back to the Treaty of Friendship in 1936.
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Numerous agreements have fortified their strategic partnership, making Saudi Arabia Egypt’s largest trading partner in the Middle East.
The strong historical and popular ties, coupled with shared interests, have imbued these relations with a unique character.
History tells us that Egypt and Saudi Arabia prioritize consultation, communication, and coordination on all bilateral and regional issues.
As cornerstones of Arab and regional security, recent political and diplomatic initiatives reflect the growing desire to deepen relations further. These moves are a testament to their ability to address shared security challenges, counter cybercrimes, and enhance capabilities through the exchange of expertise.
Strengthening Egyptian-Saudi relations during this critical period in Middle Eastern history stands as a political and diplomatic triumph.
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Egypt and Saudi Arabia have been driven not only by regional challenges but also by the bilateral development ambitions outlined in their respective national visions.
These policies aim to attract Arab and foreign investments with positive signals to the business community, including a package of tax incentives designed to improve investor relations with the Tax Authority and stimulate business activity.
The objective is to make investors feel valued, overcome tax-related obstacles, and ultimately enhance productivity and economic growth, thereby fostering a more robust macroeconomic structure reliant on production, export, and foreign trade.
In 1943, then-Prince Faysal was the architect of the Saudi relationship with the United States when he visited Washington and met with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The two agreed that the United States would build an airbase in Dhahran to support the American global war effort.
Early Cooperation and Shifting Alliances
In the years immediately after the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia were cordial, driven by mutual suspicion of the Hashemites reigning in Jordan and (especially) Iraq at the time, and continuing from an anti-Hashemite alliance formed by King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, King Farouk of Egypt and President Shukri al-Quwatli of Syria after the foundation of the Arab League in 1945.
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Subsequently, Nasser and King Saud co-operated to limit the reach of the Baghdad Pact, which they felt was designed to increase the influence of Hashemite Iraq. As a result, the two countries signed a bilateral military pact in 1955 and worked to successfully prevent Jordan from joining the Baghdad Pact. Egypt came to have extensive involvement in the Saudi army, economy and education system.
However, the alliance was undermined by Saudi anxieties about the Egyptian government's promotion of anti-monarchical forces in the Arab World (including the uncovering of an Egyptian-style Saudi Free Officers Movement and increasing labour unrest).
Thus under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt, backed by the Soviet Union, came to represent the Non-Aligned Movement and pan-Arabism, and was a nominal advocate of secularism and republicanism.
Pro-Nasser governments were often military dictatorships founded after a military coup against a conservative monarchy, such as Libya after the 1969 Libyan coup d'état.
The Saudis, by contrast, were strong supporters of absolute monarchy and Islamist theocracy, and were generally close to the governments of the United Kingdom and United States. The Saudi-Egyptian rivalry was the main conflict of the Arab Cold War.
The June 1967 war was a decisive turning point for Saudi Arabia, its foreign policy, and its relations with the United States.
Before the June war, Saudi Arabia saw secular revolutionary Arab nationalism led by Egyptian President Gamal abd al Nasser as the greatest threat to its survival.
At the Arab summit in Khartoum after the war, Faysal and Nasser buried the hatchet and ended their struggle for dominance in the Arab world. Egypt withdrew from Yemen and the Saudis stopped aiding the Royalists.
Saudi animosity shifted from Egypt and radical Arab nationalism to Israel.
Faysal’s priorities were drastically redrawn. His top goal now was to recover Arab control of East Jerusalem which had been lost by King Hussein’s Jordan.
Faysal also sought to create a pan-Islamic movement. His efforts culminated two years after the war with the first Islamic summit in Morocco, which was convened to protest Israeli actions in Jerusalem.
But in 1967, Faysal was extremely disappointed with the American response to the June war. In his eyes, Israel was the aggressor that had started the fighting with its air attack on Egypt.
Faysal was most concerned with Jerusalem and the Islamic holy sites. Their recovery became his life’s work.
Relations with President Johnson deteriorated, and the crisis came with his successor Richard Nixon and the 1973 war and oil embargo.
The Yemen Civil War: A Proxy Conflict
Led by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptians funneled money, arms, and eventually ground troops to support revolutionaries in North Yemen who had taken power through an Egyptian-sponsored coup on September 26, 1962.
The Saudi Arabian government would not stand for the removal of a monarchy on its southern border by Nasserist forces.
The civil war dragged on for eight years, tying down 60,000 Egyptian troops during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, which many believe contributed to the Arab defeat.
The Saudis were helping the royalists but of course the amount of help they gave was not nearly as much as the Egyptians could give. They had an advisor in every ministry and they had their own military command.
The Egyptians sent in a lot of troops. But then they tried to get out in the wild areas and the north and east, and that’s where they really began to get creamed by the tribesmen. But they really controlled everything that was very significant with a couple of exceptions.
The Yemen affair, more than anything else, soured our relations with Nasser.
Saudi attempts to reestablish a monarchical regime in North Yemen were going nowhere. Early in 1970, King Faisal finally decided to stop supporting the royalists and to establish diplomatic relations with the Yemen Arab Republic.
Gamal Abdel Nasser and Abdullah as-Sallal
Economic Ties and Political Shifts
The Saudis also doubled the amount of money they sent to Egypt in subsidies in the early 1970s to $200 million a year, bought French Mirage fighter jets on the Egyptians' behalf to reduce their reliance on Soviet military technology, and offered low-interest loans to Egypt.
Mubarak's Egypt (1981 - 2011) continued the conservative dictatorship closely allied with the United States that started under Sadat, though sought to repair ties with the Arab nations broken in 1979.
Nevertheless, over Mubarak's three decade rule, there remained a rivalry between the two countries, both aspiring to preeminence in the Arab World in general and among the Arab allies of the US in particular.
During the 2011 Egyptian revolution, Saudi King Abdullah expressed support for Hosni Mubarak. "No Arab or Muslim can tolerate any meddling in the security and stability of Arab and Muslim Egypt by those who infiltrated the people in the name of freedom of expression, exploiting it to inject their destructive hatred.
Following the protests Saudi authorities announced the closure of the Saudi embassy and other consulates in Egypt.
On 10 May 2012, ambassador Kattan announced that the kingdom agreed to provide US$500 million in aid to Egypt and will deposit an additional US$1 billion at the country's central bank as part of the $2.7 billion support package they had agreed in 2011.
Saudi Arabia will also export $250 million worth of butane to Egypt, which has faced ongoing shortages of the fuel, as well as US$200 million to help small and mid-sized firms.
In April 2016, King Salman of Saudi Arabia made a five-day visit to Egypt, during which the two countries signed economic agreements worth approximately $25 billion and also made an agreement to "return" Tiran and Sanafir, two Egyptian-administered islands in the Gulf of Aqaba, to Saudi control.
Any observer of the relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over the last few months will have noticed considerable tensions. This is unexpected since Riyadh had strongly backed President Sisi’s government after the 2013 military coup, offering tens of billions of dollars in aid and fuel supplies, and Cairo in return had pledged its full diplomatic, political and military support for the kingdom.
Egypt even agreed to return control of two Red Sea islands (Tiran and Sanafir) to Saudi Arabia. This deal was to be the first step in a much larger plan that would link the two countries by a bridge spanning the Straits of Tiran, and lead to the economic development on both shores.
The relationship, however, has soured, and quite rapidly since June 2016.
Egypt’s courts have repeatedly, and on appeal, refused to approve the Red Sea islands hand-over, despite President Sisi’s promise that this agreement would be implemented.
In response to the legal decision on the islands, the Saudis have either cancelled or put on hold financial aid agreements and preferential oil shipments.
Riyadh and Cairo have very different assessments of the Syrian war and, more generally, of Iran’s influence in the region. Saudi Arabia is adamant that President Assad must go whereas Cairo seems to prefer that he stays in power, favoring a military authoritarian regime in Syria over the rule of Islamists who would undoubtedly take over if Assad is toppled.
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