Ethiopia, a country with a complex history of ethnic tensions and regional power struggles, has been facing significant internal and external challenges. These challenges range from ongoing conflicts in various regions to geopolitical tensions with neighboring countries. This article aims to provide a detailed overview of the current Ethiopian conflict landscape, examining the key players, agreements, and humanitarian impacts.
Historical Context
For decades before the war, the TPLF was a dominant political force in Ethiopia. Between 1991 and his death in 2012, Tigrayan soldier-politician Meles Zenawi governed Ethiopia as an autocracy with the backing of a TPLF-dominated coalition. The Zenawi regime oversaw rapid development and increased Ethiopia’s international prominence, but his government marginalized ethnic groups, including the Oromo and Amhara, to solidify government power. Additionally, Ethiopia was at war with Eritrea from 1998 to 2000. The TPLF continued to govern Ethiopia after Zenawi’s passing until 2018, when protests, especially among the Oromo population, prompted the government to appoint Abiy Ahmed Ali as the next prime minister.
Abiy, born in Oromia, was heralded by international actors and Ethiopians as the country’s new hope for peace and ethnic harmony. Early in his premiership, he promised to heal broken trust between the country’s ethnic groups and began to roll back restrictions on certain political freedoms. By 2020, ethnic relations within Ethiopia began to deteriorate once again. Repeated delays of long-promised national elections and the June 2020 extension of Abiy’s first term provoked indignation from the TPLF. The Tigray State Council’s decision to hold local elections in defiance of federal orders further inflamed tensions. These elections ultimately solidified the TPLF’s control over the region.
The Tigray War (2020-2022)
On November 4, 2020, Abiy accused Tigrayan troops of attacking a federal military camp in the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle, and ordered Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) troops to move north. Abiy initially framed the offensive as a targeted operation against TPLF leadership. A communications blackout at the outset of the conflict shuttered coverage of ground conditions. However, by December 2020, media and UN officials began sounding the alarm about the improper treatment of civilians, predominantly ethnic Tigrayans.
Ethiopia’s neighbor and former adversary, Eritrea, intervened militarily on the side of the Ethiopian government. In 2021, the United States characterized the war as an ethnic cleansing against Tigrayans, and some NGOs raised concerns about the potential of genocide. Tigrayan forces retook the regional capital of Mekelle from the ENDF in June 2021. A month later, Addis Ababa announced the results of a national parliamentary election, which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed won in a landslide. The TPLF boycotted the election, and opposition leadership in parliament accused the Abiy government of banning poll observers in some states.
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Later, in the summer of 2021, Abiy called on all capable citizens to join the war against Tigrayan forces as the conflict began to spill over into the Afar and Amhara regions, growing closer to Addis Ababa. The conflict divided Ethiopia along ethnic lines. Oromia’s regional army, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), allied itself with the TPLF, while militants from Amhara and Afar, regions bordering Tigray, sided with federal forces. In 2021, the government declared a state of emergency in Amhara after a series of attacks against ethnic Oromos. Similar bouts of ethnic violence occurred in Oromia, where local militants began attacking Amhara-majority enclaves in March 2021, forcing thousands to flee. As the war intensified, the attacks worsened. In June 2022, more than two hundred Amhara were murdered in Oromia.
After a series of failed efforts to negotiate a settlement to the civil war, the TPLF and the Ethiopian central government signed a cessation of hostilities agreement on November 2, 2022, in Pretoria, South Africa. Notably, the Pretoria Agreement does not explicitly mention Eritrea, nor were Eritrean representatives present at the negotiations. This omission raised international concern that Eritrean troops would continue operations within Ethiopia despite the agreement between the Ethiopian government and TPLF. Indeed, displaced Tigrayans reported in January 2023 that Amhara and Eritrean soldiers continued to occupy Western Tigray. The Amhara continued to contest ownership of the area, and the federal government eventually announced that the political fate of the territory would be decided in a referendum. As of early 2025, however, the referendum is yet to take place.
Internal Conflicts and Tensions
Tensions in Ethiopia’s Tigray region have escalated significantly, threatening to reignite conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and destabilize the Horn of Africa. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is embroiled in a power struggle with the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), appointed by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2023 as part of the Pretoria Agreement that ended the civil war from 2020 to 2022. This internal division has led to violent clashes, with TPLF-aligned forces seizing control of key areas in Tigray. Eritrea is reportedly supporting these dissident factions of the TPLF, potentially undermining Ethiopia’s ambitions for sea access. The situation is further exacerbated by the incomplete implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, including the Tigray Defense Forces’ disarmament and the continued presence of Eritrean troops in Ethiopia.
Two years since the establishment of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray the Tigray region is still facing unrest, as security forces supporting the Debretsion faction forcefully take control of various local administrations in Central and Southeast Tigray zones. Tensions have been brewing since the signing of the Pretoria agreement, which brought an end to the northern Ethiopia conflict between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government. The interim administration was created in accordance with Article 10 of the Pretoria agreement. According to this agreement, the interim administration should be inclusive and is intended to remain in place until elections are conducted in the region. Since its inception, the interim administration has faced numerous challenges, such as ensuring political inclusivity, security concerns, and internal conflicts.
The rift within the TPLF, which resulted in two factions - one led by Getachew Reda, the president of the interim regional administration, and the other by Debretsion Gebremichael, the TPLF president - has hindered the interim administration from fulfilling its responsibilities. The internal dispute within the TPLF escalated in January 2025 after two major developments.
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First, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) issued a statement on 26 December 2024 urging the TPLF to convene its general assembly meeting - a key step in the group’s path to re-registration as a political party - before the 10 February deadline. Second, following this statement, the Debretsion faction ramped up its plan to control the interim administration, and on 23 January, approximately 200 senior leaders from the Tigray forces issued a statement endorsing the resolutions from the 14th general assembly convened by the Debretsion faction and calling for the reorganization of the interim administration to include members from the Debretsion-led TPLF.
During this general assembly, the Getachew faction was ousted from TPLF positions and the assembly called for reorganizing the interim administration, replacing the ousted TPLF members with those appointed during the assembly. This effort to control the interim administration has escalated. On 10 March, Getachew, as president of the interim administration, sent a letter to the Tigray Peace and Security Bureau, dismissing three top TDF generals after accusing them of inciting violence among the youth and security forces. The Tigray Peace and Security Bureau and the TPLF faction led by Debretsion rejected the decision.
In the meantime, members of the TDF who support the Debretsion faction continued confiscating the stamps of various local officials and seizing control of administrative offices. On 11 March, around 44 members of the TDF forcefully took control of the stamps and administration office of Adi Gudem town in the Southeast Tigray zone. They also abducted around seven local officials, including the mayor and his deputy. The security forces also shot and injured at least four civilians who were among those gathered at the office to oppose the security forces’ actions. The next day, on 12 March, members of the TDF conducted house-to-house searches and abducted an unspecified number of residents, prevented civil servants from entering their office, and established various checkpoints. They also dispersed protestors on 12 March who gathered to oppose the takeover.
This forceful takeover was not limited to Adi Gudem town. The security forces and the mayors of Mekele and Adigrat and the Debretsion faction-appointed East Tigray zone administrator also took over their respective offices. The Mekele mayor’s office was closed for over 100 days due to a dispute over the two mayors, one appointed by the interim administration and another appointed by the Debretsion-sympathetic Mekele city council. The security forces also established various checkpoints across these cities, took control of the Mekele FM 104.4 radio station, and reinstated boards appointed by the Debretsion faction.
Getachew accused the TDF commanders of attempting to overthrow the interim administration by allying with the Debretsion faction and admitted that the interim government had lost control of the Central and Southeast zones of Tigray. One report indicated that, other than in the South Tigray zone, local administrations are now controlled by the Debretsion faction. The president also accused some members of the Debretsion faction and TDF leaders of colluding with the Eritreans to initiate a war between the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments. He did not yet name these leaders. The relationship between the two governments deteriorated after the Ethiopian government signed the Pretoria peace agreement.
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To avoid further violence, Getachew indirectly invited the federal government to intervene. The federal government can only intervene in regional issues after an official invitation from the regional government indicating its inability to maintain stability in the region. Various members of the international community, including the European Union, African Union, and the US Embassy, stated their concern over the recent developments in Tigray, calling on each side to resolve their differences through dialogue. For the first time, the federal government accused one of the TPLF factions of having contact with a foreign force, without specifying, and trying to initiate violence in the region by removing the interim administration during a briefing to foreign diplomats with Getachew.
Though it has been two years since the interim administration was formed and the peace agreement was signed, the Tigray region continues to experience turmoil and is still not ready to conduct elections to create a regional government. The peace agreement was originally intended for the interim administration to last between six months to one year, with the expectation of elections occurring within that year. On 13 February, the NEBE suspended the TPLF for three months from being involved in any political activity until it holds the general assembly as per the requirements of the election board. The NEBE stipulated that it must be informed at least 21 days prior to the general assembly to ensure board members could attend to monitor proceedings.
At least three civilians were killed in the Kore (also known as Amaro) zone in the South Ethiopia region due to an ongoing border dispute with the neighboring Gelana woreda of Guji zone in the Oromia region. According to the government and witnesses, on 8 March, suspected militants of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) - referred to by the government as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane - who came from the neighboring Gelana woreda shot two people dead while they were herding cattle. They also injured another woman in Jello kebele in Gorka woreda in the Kore zone. The OLA/OLF-Shane denied it had shot the herders, saying its forces do not attack civilians and that such attacks were coordinated by the government with the aim of turning the population against the group.
Additionally, according to one Kore People’s Regional Council representative, one of the herders and the injured woman were shot by intoxicated Ethiopian National Defense Force members. A few days later, on 12 March, suspected OLA/OLF-Shane militants from the neighboring Gelana woreda shot and killed a farmer while he was working on a farm with his family in Dano Tulto Kebele Gorka woreda. On 11 March, members of Fano militias ambushed and killed three people - the head of the Werebabo woreda administration, the head of the woreda police criminal investigation division, and their driver - at an unspecified location in Werebabu woreda in South Wello zone. The victims were conducting fieldwork at the time of the attack. From 1 to 14 March, ACLED records 75 political violence events in the region - 95% of the armed clashes between Fano militias and security forces. The conflict between Fano militias and the government is affecting the daily activities of civilians.
Geopolitical Tensions and Regional Implications
In 2023, Ethiopia and Eritrea reignited political hostilities, marking a troubling shift in their relationship. Tensions flared between the two countries when Abiy began signaling Ethiopia’s intention to secure a Red Sea port, and, with it, participation in international maritime trade. Ethiopia has been landlocked since the 1990s when the coastal region of Eritrea broke away to form an independent state following a decades-long war of independence. In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland (a semi-independent state in Somalia), in which it promised to recognize the latter’s independence in exchange for access to a nineteen-kilometer-long stretch of coastline on the Gulf of Aden.
Recent events have further destabilized Tigray, raising fears of a return to civil war. In August 2024, the TPLF excluded Getachew Reda, the interim regional administrator for the federally-appointed Tigrayan Interim Administration (TIA), from its fourteenth Congress. The TPLF has taken effective control of the region’s two largest cities, Mekelle and Ad Gudan, after a series of skirmishes with federal forces that have killed, injured, and displaced thousands of civilians. The violence threatens to escalate into a regional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The two countries have traded diplomatic accusations in recent months, and now appear to have mobilized forces to the border. Eritrea fears an emboldened Abiy may look to seize Assab and Massawa, two ports along the Eritrean coast, in his quest for sea access.
Ethiopia’s destabilization holds significant security implications for the Horn of Africa, a region that is facing armed conflict in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan. Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan have been locked in a political dispute since 2011 over Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a hydroelectric dam on the Nile River that restricts the northern flow of freshwater. During the Tigray War, tensions were also reignited between Ethiopia and Sudan over the fertile border region of Al Fashaga, where governance rights have been contested since the early 1900s.
Defense Minister Abdukadir Mohamed stated that Somalia and Ethiopia have an ongoing security cooperation agreement, particularly in counterterrorism operations against Al-Shabaab. He cited the Ankara agreement as the framework guiding their military collaboration. Ethiopian military aircraft carried out airstrikes on Al-Shabaab positions in Somalia's Middle Shabelle region, Somali Defense Minister confirmed Thursday. He said the airstrikes were conducted with the approval of the Somali government as part of security cooperation agreement. New AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia to be discussed in Addis Ababa.
Humanitarian Crisis
The effects of the war have been devastating. In 2021 alone, 5.1 million Ethiopians became internally displaced, a record for the most people internally displaced in any country in any single year at the time. Thousands fled to Sudan and other neighboring countries. Ethnic Tigrayan members of Ethiopian components of United Nations peacekeeping missions were disarmed and some forcibly flown back to Ethiopia, at the risk of torture or execution, according to United Nations officials. Wartime rape and sexual violence was also widespread, being perpetrated by virtually all sides. There were "deeply distressing reports of sexual and gender-based violence, extrajudicial killings, [and the] widespread destruction and looting of public and private property by all parties" according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.
A survey estimated that, over the course of the conflict, around 1 in 10 women in Tigray were subjected to sexual violence, 8 in 100 were subjected to rape, and 4 in 100 were subjected to gang rape. In February 2021, GOAL Ethiopia, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), MCMDO, MSF-Spain, and World Vision, found that nearly one in seven children in 16 woredas and town administrations across Tigray were acutely malnourished. There was limited access to clean water due to hygiene and sanitation services largely being disrupted across Tigray. The Tigray Regional Water Bureau reported that out of 36 villages it assessed, only 4 had partially functioning water sources. Along with that, an estimated 250 motorized water pumping systems have been out of order, and the status of 11,000 hand pumps in rural areas was unknown.
According to the UN, in March 2021, out of more than 260 health centres in Tigray before the war, only 31 were fully functional, while 7 were partially functional. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), all of the functioning hospitals and health centres in Tigray had a lack of medical supplies, drugs, and equipment. UN partners reported continued looting of health facilities. According to the United Nations (UN), some 2.3 million children have been cut off from desperately needed aid and humanitarian assistance.
Since the start of the conflict, the Ethiopian federal government has strictly controlled access to the Tigray Region, and the UN has said it is frustrated that talks with the Ethiopian government had not yet secured adequate humanitarian access for "food, including ready-to-use therapeutic food for the treatment of child malnutrition, medicines, water, fuel, and other essentials that are running low" said UNICEF. By 13 March 2021, the UN and its partners reached about 900,000 people with complete food baskets, and 700,000 people with clean water. Despite the progress made, many are still hard to reach due to ongoing fighting. In September 2021, the humanitarian situation continued to worsen in Tigray, Afar and Amhara Regions, due both to the armed conflict itself and due to bureaucratic obstruction.
In November 2020, the UN warned of "very critical" supply shortages for the nearly 100,000 Eritrean refugees who, prior to the war, were registered in four camps in Tigray region. Later that same month, the UN reported that people in Tigray were fleeing Mekelle. Most appeared to be authentic accounts from people seeking to raise international awareness of the conflict in the midst of a communications blackout in Tigray.
Ethiopian Civil War: What You Need to Know About the Humanitarian Crisis in Tigray
Key Events and Figures
To provide a clearer understanding of the timeline and key events, the following table summarizes some of the critical moments in the Ethiopian conflict:
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| November 4, 2020 | Abiy accuses Tigrayan troops of attacking a federal military camp in Mekelle, initiating military action. |
| December 2020 | Media and UN officials raise concerns about the treatment of civilians, predominantly ethnic Tigrayans. |
| June 2021 | Tigrayan forces retake Mekelle from the ENDF. |
| November 2, 2022 | The TPLF and the Ethiopian government sign the Pretoria Agreement. |
| January 2024 | Ethiopia signs a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland for access to the Red Sea. |
| August 2024 | TPLF excludes Getachew Reda from its Congress, escalating internal tensions. |
Internal migration due to the Tigray war.
