Rising political instability in Chad since the April 2021 death of the country’s longtime president has sparked concern about risks of large-scale violence against civilians.
According to the Early Warning Project, Chad ranks fourth in the world-its highest ranking to date-for the risk of experiencing a new mass killing beginning in 2022 or 2023. Chad has continued to move up the risk list after being ranked tenth last year and 23rd the year before. Recent developments combined with underlying dynamics in Chad indicate significant mass atrocity risks that demand immediate action.
Map of Chad showing its strategic location in Central Africa.
An Unexpected Death Yields a Troubled “Transition”
Research indicates large-scale instability is one of the strongest predictors of the onset of mass atrocities.
In April 2021, Chad’s longtime president, Idriss Déby, died from injuries sustained while visiting government troops fighting rebels in the north. Following the president’s death, Déby’s son, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, became interim leader and head of a Transitional Military Council.
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In a move experts labeled unconstitutional, the council announced it would govern for 18 months before returning to civilian rule. After multiple delays, the national dialogue intended to chart the country’s path toward civilian rule began in August 2022. However, several key opposition groups did not participate, raising concerns surrounding the dialogue’s inclusiveness.
In October 2022, the dialogue concluded alongside the controversial announcement of a two-year extension to the transition and a decision to allow junta members to run in the 2024 elections.
Anti-government demonstrators set a barricade on fire during clashes in N'Djamena, Chad, Thursday Oct. 20, 2022. -AP Photo
Violent Repression of Opposition
Thousands of people took to the street across several cities in Chad to protest the extension of the transition period on October 20, 2022, the date it was originally set to end. Chadian security forces responded violently, firing at protesters and using tear gas. Civil society groups reported that dozens of people were killed; Chad's National Human Rights Commission estimated the death toll at 128.
Additionally, reports indicate security forces wounded and arrested hundreds of people. The transitional government began a mass trial in November and sentenced 262 people allegedly involved in the protests. Even before the October protests, Chadian authorities had used violent tactics to repress the opposition.
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Despite some signs of progress during the National Inclusive and Sovereign Dialogue (DNIS) last October, security forces engaged in violent crackdowns of protests shortly afterward - killing dozens of civilians.
The distribution of power remains personal, based partly on family clan ties, and has led to increased fields of contestation, conflicts and violence.
Meanwhile, most Chadians face complete disillusionment. A significant portion of citizens do not recognize themselves in the process that led to the DNIS, let alone what came afterward.
Given the opaque transitional process and systematic repression of dissenting voices in Chad, it is crucial for partners to clearly stand with the Chadian people.
Instability Inherent to Chadian Authoritarianism: Political repression increased in the last years of Idriss Déby’s life. Opposition leaders routinely faced threats to their lives with tragic consequences.
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Déby also relied on institutional maneuvers to manipulate the political system to his advantage. In 2018, he organized a national conference, which excluded many prominent opposition figures, to rewrite the constitution.
Under Déby’s rule, Chad has consistently ranked as one of the five poorest countries in the world. The measure and persistence of the country’s underdevelopment is sobering, particularly considering that the oil sector provides about 60 percent of export revenues and up to one third of overall GDP since coming online in 2003.
Multiple Underlying Risks
The recent instability and violence in Chad occurred in an already-fragile context with multiple dynamics that could escalate into large-scale, systematic attacks on civilians. One potential mass atrocity scenario would be, in essence, an escalation of the kind of attacks that occurred last October.
In a 2022 interview with the Simon-Skjodt Center, Chad expert Jérôme Tubiana warned that the junta facing contestation or losing control could drive atrocity risks. To thwart growing contestation, Déby has continued efforts to consolidate power and restrict the opposition. This raises concerns that groups perceived to oppose the transitional government may increasingly face violent repression, especially if large public demonstrations arise or are sustained.
In addition, some political actors have sought to attract support by appealing to-and in a sense, weaponizing-regional tensions and identities. Elites from Chad’s northern region have long dominated the country’s government. Frustration among southern communities at the extended Déby regime-amplified following the October violence-has fueled more resistance toward the transitional government. Social media, which is becoming more popular in Chad, may also be deepening the increasingly politicized divide between northern and southern communities, with potential to accelerate violence.
National-level political instability risks worsening underlying and interrelated dynamics across the country, including, but not limited to, the following:
- The Lake Chad Basin has seen increasing extremist violence and millions displaced in the region. Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa, as well as military operations designed to counter them, pose continued risks for civilians.
- Tensions between farmers and herders have continued, particularly in southern and central Chad. Between 2020 and August 2022, 300 people reportedly died due to these conflicts. Additionally, reports indicate the government of Chad has supported herders, contributing to the intensification of these dynamics.
- In the east, violence in neighboring Darfur could spill over into Chad. As Jérôme Tubiana explained, scenarios might include Chadian Arabs, potentially linked to the Janjaweed militias, waging large-scale violence against non-Arab groups in Chad or against Sudanese refugees in Chad.
According to recent reporting, US intelligence alleged that the Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization accused of committing atrocities and human rights violations in the region, has sought to help armed Chadian opposition groups remove President Déby, furthering concerns of potential violence against civilians.
Additionally, the United Nations has referred to Chad as falling “at the epicenter of climate change.” As of October 2022, nearly all Chadian provinces saw severe flooding, affecting more than a million people and devastating farmland. Climate change has aggravated resource scarcity in Chad, raising alarm that it may be intensifying conflict, displacement, and the country's broader humanitarian crisis.
Chad faces security challenges related to conflicts in neighboring countries, as well as the consequences of climate change, particularly the acceleration of desertification and the drying up of Lake Chad.
Due to the Sudanese crisis and the continuous arrival of new refugees and returnees, the Chadian government estimates that nearly 900,000 people could arrive by the end of 2025. Chad was already hosting around 450,000 refugees from Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Nigeria.
Chad continues to be affected by conflicts and violent groups in neighboring countries, straining stability and public finances. In 2025, military spending rose 11.6% from the previous year, reaching 23% of domestic revenues.
Flooding in Chad, exacerbating humanitarian crisis.
Chad’s 2021 Military Coup d’État
Idriss Déby came to power as a rebel, and in Chad’s post-independence history, all transfers of power have occurred by force.
General Azem Bermendao Agouna announced Déby’s death and the seizure of power by the military junta simultaneously. Ignoring the constitutionally enshrined process, the junta anointed Mahamat Idriss Déby as interim head of state.
By taking these actions, the junta has shown an unwillingness to cede authority to a civilian, preferring to manage the rebellion on its own terms. This is particularly clear in the ongoing clashes between the military and FACT. After initially rejecting the military junta’s claim to power, FACT rebels made overtures for a cease fire and dialogue. The junta, however, responded by publicly excluding any possibility of negotiation.
Worse, it may bring additional militants into the fray, sparking state-led violence against communities within which these armed groups have strong constituencies.
Possible Indications of Faltering Control
Deteriorating security may also contribute to a fracturing of the armed forces. The Chadian military is often praised as one of the most effective fighting forces in the region. Many units within the armed forces have significant combat experience from fighting rebellions at home as well as combat tours abroad in Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic. Units have also mobilized against threats emanating from Sudan and Libya and have contributed to UN peacekeeping missions.
The composition of the armed forces, however, remains highly fragmented with certain units and leadership structures benefiting disproportionately due to their ties to the Déby regime. This is perhaps most evident in the Direction générale de service de sécurité des institutions de l’État (DGSSIE). These elite special forces within the army deploy on counterterrorism missions and were used by Déby as a domestic military intelligence service and praetorian guard. They have similarly benefitted from disproportionate access to training and equipment procurements. Mahamat Idriss Déby has led the DGSSIE since 2014, reporting directly to his father.
Other units within the military have not benefited from close ties to the regime. These include units comprised of former rebels that had been integrated into the national armed forces under Déby’s rule. Control over these units depended on patronage and ethno-regional ties to their respective territories. It is not at all clear that Mahamat Idriss Déby, or those who compose the leadership of the junta, will be able to fully command the fealty of these units, particularly in the event of widespread conflict or insecurity.
Protests against the junta’s illegal seizure of power erupted in the streets of N’Djamena and other urban centers in the country. The junta reacted by firing live ammunition on demonstrators resulting in several deaths and hundreds arrested. These actions have strengthened the political opposition’s condemnation of the coup.
Chadian civil society has also played a role in pressuring the government, often under the risk of severe repression. Leading voices from the Chadian Human Rights League and the Association of Chadian Unions have already denounced the military junta, calling for a civilian-led transition. Other civil society organizations opposed to Déby’s continued evasion of presidential terms limits and the manipulation of the constitution to his benefit have also expressed their opposition.
Countering Violent Extremism
Chad actively opposed violent extremism. The High Council of Islamic Affairs promoted peaceful coexistence and tolerance, and diverse faith groups utilized the Interfaith Dialogue Commission to engage in mitigating conflict. Surrounded by conflict, Chad is a leader in exporting security forces to contribute to regional stability in the Sahel.
Chad contributed 1,425 soldiers to Mali as part of MINUSMA; 2,000 soldiers in support of the MNJTF; and 650 soldiers in northern Chad as part of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force East Zone Headquarters. Chad also supports the Chad-Sudan Mixed Force by contributing 600 soldiers as part of the joint border security effort with Sudan.
N’Djamena hosts the headquarters of the five-nation (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) MNJTF, which was formed to counter the threat posed by ISIS-WA, al-Qa’ida, and BH in the Lake Chad region.
Political Situation
The presidential election in May 2024 and local elections in December 2024 should allow for a return to constitutional order and stability. However, the post-election situation is marked by a political crisis following the arrest and 20-year sentence of Succès Masra, president of the Transformers party and main opponent.
On October 3, 2025, the Chadian Parliament (National Assembly and Senate) approved amendments to the constitution that extends the President’s term from five years to seven years without limit. The session was boycotted by some opposition parties. The new constitution was promulgated by the head of state on October 8, 2025.
Economic Overview
Chad’s economic performance has been marked by volatility and modest growth, driven by its heavy reliance on oil. The sector represents around 15% of GDP, contributes 41% of government revenues, and accounts for 76% of exports.
Agriculture, accounting for roughly 40% of GDP and supporting much of the population, has been repeatedly affected by droughts, floods, conflict and displacement.
The labor market is largely informal (about 88% of jobs) and agriculture based.
Financial stability remains fragile amid undercapitalization, high NPLs, and lagging prudential standards at public banks. The authorities are restructuring the two main public banks while undertaking efforts to bolster stability, expand inclusion, and strengthen Supervision.
Chad’s economy is expected to grow by 3.4% in 2025 (-0.1% per capita), mainly driven by non-oil sector growth (+4.2%). Oil GDP growth is estimated at -0.7% due to a decline in oil production.
The current account deficit (CAD) is expected to widen to 2.5% of GDP in 2025 due to a deteriorating trade balance. After reaching 5.7% in 2024, inflation is projected to ease to 4.1% in 2025. The poverty rate is expected to rise by 0.8 pp to 45.4%, with 9.5 million people living in extreme poverty.
GDP growth is projected to average 3.9% (1.2% per capita) over 2026-2027. Over the medium term, non-oil GDP growth is expected to average 4.2%. After four years above the target, inflation is projected to moderate to around 3.1% in the medium term.
Key Economic Indicators for Chad (2025 Projections)
| Indicator | Value |
|---|---|
| GDP Growth | 3.4% |
| Non-Oil GDP Growth | 4.2% |
| Oil GDP Growth | -0.7% |
| Current Account Deficit (CAD) | 2.5% of GDP |
| Inflation | 4.1% |
| Poverty Rate | 45.4% |
Priorities for International Action
The tense transition period ahead of national elections now slated for 2024 necessitates that the US government and others monitor the situation in Chad closely, fully assess the multiple risks of mass atrocities, and take steps to mitigate risks in advance of a potential larger crisis.
Governments’ efforts to maintain a security relationship with Chad should not deter efforts to prevent mass atrocities. Chad’s status as a security partner requires its stability, for which the transitional government’s protection of civilians and respect for human rights is vital.
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